Avoiding digitalization traps: Tools for top managers

Digital transformation is fundamentally changing the business landscape. It is also affecting the roles of top managers within firms. Our survey of more than 160 senior managers in Europe suggests that digitalization, rather than encouraging more decentralized forms of management, will lead to an expanded role for headquarters and further empowerment of top managers. While acknowledging the benefits of the digital transformation, in this Executive Digest we identify five key challenges for newly empowered top managers and offer solutions for these digitalization traps.     

Representatives of future generations as promoters of sustainability in corporate decision processes

Current protests of the young generation emphasize that interests of future generations should be taken more into account by policy makers and in corporate decision processes. As organizations contribute to enduring environmental and social problems, they are required to promote sustainability in order to preserve options for the well-being of future generations. However, organizational decision makers often take a short-term perspective and neglect investments in intergenerational justice. Previous theoretical work has acknowledged the importance of representing future generations in today's decision-making processes to adopt a long-term perspective in order to promote intergenerational justice. In a laboratory experiment, we show that appointing representatives of future generations at the organizational level can foster investments in intergenerational justice. Although this outcome is more pronounced when aligned with the representatives' individual incentives, it even persists for a representative who is monetarily penalized for advocating the interests of future generations.     

Corporate diversification and innovation: Managerial myopia or inefficient internal capital markets?

Which is more innovative: the decentralized, diversified firm, or the centralized, more narrowly focused firm? The economics and finance literatures argue that diversified firms have innovation advantages as their operating units have access to an internal capital market. In contrast, the strategy and entrepreneurship literatures argue that managers of these firms suffer from “managerial myopia,” discouraging them from investing in projects with long-term, uncertain payoffs. We take a fresh look at the relationship between innovation and diversification using a comprehensive sample of diversified and nondiversified firms and a novel approach that teases out the mechanisms influencing the relationship between diversification and innovation. Consistent with conceptual and empirical work in strategy, we find a robust negative correlation between diversification and R&D intensity, suggesting that diversification reduces innovation by discouraging investment. However, our analysis suggests that internal capital market inefficiencies, rather than managerial myopia, is responsible for this observed negative relationship.     

The COVID-19 crisis: A public choice view

Many observers have been puzzled by the sight of otherwise freedom-loving citizens consenting to the stripping of their civil rights and the massive budgetary expansion of their governments in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. Conversely, governments who ‘kept their cool’ such as those of Brazil and Sweden were heavily criticised by the Western media. Adopting James Buchanan's contractarian approach, this article seeks to model how the interplay between citizens and their government is affected by a health crisis. Citizens' increased willingness to pay for improved control of risks is found to play a major role.     

Business Cycles Synchronisation and Symmetries in the Transition to East African Monetary Union

Our paper explores the prospects for the proposed East African Monetary Union (EAMU) by employing rigorous empirical tools to analyse business cycles synchronisation, structural cross-correlations, spectral decomposition and regional clusters to identify different cyclical episodes, periodicities and characterise the economic cycles of East African countries. We find that cyclical movements reflect various idiosyncratic, common, historical and external shocks in the region. Secondly, all countries appear to be structurally correlated with each other except for South Sudan and Burundi. Our results also observe that the contemporaneous co-movements of East African Community (EAC) cycles with those of Kenya and Tanzaniaare procyclical with coincidental path shift, while the same EAC cycles appear to be acyclical with those of Burundi. Additionally, from the spectral decomposition, Kenyan cycles take 10 years to complete, while those of Tanzania and Rwanda take 8 years. Ugandan and Burundian cycles take approximately 5 years, while the cyclical frequency for South Sudan corresponds to 3.3 years. Finally, the cluster characterisation of countries reveals that South Sudan, Burundi and Rwanda form a group, while Kenya and Tanzania from a group distinct from the rest. We urge the member countries to prioritise policies on regional risk-sharing and adjustment mechanisms, in addition to establishing credible institutional infrastructure that ensures surveillance and enforcement of convergence conditions adopted in EAMU protocol.     

Real Incentive Effects of Soft Information

Both soft, noncontractible, and hard, contractible, information are informative about managerial ability and future firm performance. If a manager's future compensation depends on expectations of ability or future performance, then the manager has implicit incentives to affect the information. We examine the real incentive effects of soft information in a dynamic agency with limited commitment. When long-term contracts are renegotiated, the rewards for future performance inherent in long-term contracts allow the principal partial control over the implicit incentives. This is because the soft information affects the basis for contract renegotiation. With short-term contracts, the principal has no control over the basis for contract negotiation, and thus long-term contracts generally dominate short-term contracts. With long-term contracts, the principal's control over implicit incentives is characterized in terms of effective contracting on an implicit aggregation of the soft information that arises from predicting (forming expectations of) future performance. We provide sufficient conditions for soft information to have no real incentive effects. In general, implicit incentives not controllable by the principal include fixed effects, such as career concerns driven by labor markets external to the agency. When controllable incentives span the fixed effects of career concerns, the latter have no real effects with regard to total managerial incentives—they would optimally be the same with or without career concerns. Our analysis suggests empirical tests for estimating career concerns that should explicitly incorporate noncontractible information.     

Income Smoothing and the Usefulness of Earnings for Monitoring in Debt Contracting

We investigate whether income smoothing affects the usefulness of earnings for contracting through the monitoring role of earnings-based debt covenants. First, we examine initial contract design and predict that income smoothing will increase (decrease) the use of earnings-based covenants if income smoothing improves (reduces) the usefulness of earnings to monitor borrowers. We find that private debt contracts to borrowers with greater income smoothing are more likely to include earnings-based covenants. A structural model that explores the cause of this relationship provides evidence that smoothing improves the ability of earnings to reflect credit risk. Second, we examine technical default following contract inception. We find that income smoothing is associated with a lower likelihood of spurious technical default (when the borrower's economic performance has not declined but the loan nevertheless enters technical default). In contrast, we find no association between income smoothing and performance technical default (when the borrower's economic performance has declined). Collectively, this evidence is consistent with income smoothing improving the effectiveness of earnings-based information in monitoring borrowers.     

The Austrian School of Economics: A view from London

The Review of Austrian Economics - This paper explores the intellectual context of the Department of Economics at the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE) during the 1930s. We...